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INTERSTATE COMPETITION AND
THE RACE TO THE TOP
JONATHAN H. ADLER*

Federalism is an essential part of the Constitution’s design.
The division of sovereign power between the States and the fed‐
eral government helps foster interjurisdictional competition,
which, in turn, checks government power.1 Provided a right of
exit is maintained, the excessive imposition of economic burdens
in one jurisdiction will cause taxpayers and businesses to flee to
other jurisdictions. For this reason, federalism often is seen as a
friend of the free market.2 The existence of competing jurisdic‐
tions disciplines state intervention in the marketplace.3 But it
would be a mistake to assume that interjurisdictional competi‐
tion invariably favors market‐oriented policies, at least insofar as
alternative policy measures would enhance the welfare of state
residents. Federalism is not just for free marketeers.
Provided states cannot externalize the costs of their own policy
choices, robust interjurisdictional competition facilitates the en‐
actment of better public policy at the state level.4 Rather than in‐
ducing a “race to the bottom,” such competition can create a race
toward the top.5 Although those of us who generally favor freer
markets believe federalism will advance that cause, those who
believe more stringent regulation is welfare‐enhancing should
support interjurisdictional competition too. On both theoretical
* John Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Busi‐
ness Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This
Essay is based on remarks delivered at the Thirtieth Annual Federalist Society
National Student Symposium, held at the University of Virginia School of Law.
1. For sources discussing the benefits of interjurisdictional competition, see Jo‐
nathan Rodden & Susan Rose‐Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1521, 1530 n.45 (1997).
2. See generally Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Mar‐
ket‐Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
3. See id. at 5.
4. See id. at 5–6.
5. See id.
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and empirical grounds, competition among jurisdictions is a
powerful means to discover and promote the policies that are
most effective at providing people with what they desire.
Other participants in this Symposium have discussed wheth‐
er the U.S. Constitution embodies a particular economic theory.
Even if the Constitution does not implicitly endorse free enter‐
prise, it embodies an understanding of the nature of govern‐
ment power in economic terms. Specifically, the Constitution
embodies the theory that dividing and structuring the govern‐
ment will discipline and channel the exercise of sovereign
power for the people’s benefit. This theory of political economy
recognizes that government officials are economic actors and
that governmental institutions will respond to economic incen‐
tives. In response, James Madison thought it necessary to set
faction against faction,6 and the Framers created checks and
balances between and among the coordinate branches of the
federal government.7 Many believed that a system of dual sov‐
ereignty would provide a double security to the people and
their liberty.8
In the case of federalism, the Constitution’s structure is quite
instructive. The Constitution creates a federal government of
limited and enumerated powers that are expressly set forth,
largely in article I, section 8.9 All powers not granted to the fed‐
eral government are reserved to the States or to the people.10
The States, on the other hand, are not so limited—at least not
by the federal Constitution.11 Federal constitutional limitations

6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
7. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
8. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the peo‐
ple, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allot‐
ted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re‐
spectively, or to the people.”). This Amendment merely restated what was im‐
plicit in the delegation of enumerated powers in Article I. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (noting “the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered’” (citation omitted)).
11. State governments may be subject to further restrictions under their respec‐
tive state constitutions.
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on states—like federal powers—are limited, and these limita‐
tions are imposed against a background of reserved power. For
purposes of the federal Constitution, states possess a plenary
police power that can extend to any matter not precluded by
federal law.12 As a result, the federal government has the power
to reach only a limited set of issues and concerns, while a near
infinite set of all else remains. Even under current Supreme
Court doctrine, federal jurisdiction is authorized only in a de‐
fined set of areas, even if we may argue about how limited or
discrete those areas are.
This structure creates a presumption that states have the
power to address a given policy concern unless the Constitu‐
tion has given the federal government the express power to
intervene. This structural presumption makes sense not merely
as a constitutional matter, but also as a policy matter. That is,
we should presume that state governments should handle pol‐
icy questions unless there is reason to believe that federal in‐
tervention is necessary. Just as Congress should be able to
point to an enumerated power to justify any federal action, we
should hope that our policymakers can identify some reason
why states are incapable of addressing a particular problem
before calling for federal intervention.
This presumption not only aligns with our constitutional
structure but also creates institutional incentives that aid the
development of better public policy. The benefits of decentrali‐
zation in policymaking, particularly in economic policymaking,
are quite large.13 Among other things, the possibility that tax‐
payers or businesses may exit the state disciplines jurisdictions
and discourages the adoption of excessive tax or regulatory
burdens.14 Moreover, interjurisdictional competition can also
discourage states from taxing or regulating too little. Just as
taxpayers and business investment may flee jurisdictions that
impose excessive tax burdens, they may also flee jurisdictions
that fail to provide adequate infrastructure or environmental

12. See generally Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007).
13. See Weingast, supra note 2, at 8–9 (discussing growth in the United States as
partially attributable to decentralization).
14. See, e.g., Christopher Wills, Neighboring States Gleeful over Illinois Tax Increase,
CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/neighboring‐
states‐gleeful‐over‐illinois‐tax‐increase.
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protection. Thus, the pressures interjurisdictional competition
creates do not all push in one direction. They generally dis‐
courage states from adopting policies that are suboptimal and
fail to enhance the welfare of the residents of that jurisdiction.
Interjurisdictional competition is but one benefit that flows
from federalism. Decentralizing authority over various policy
matters also leaves states free to account for regional variation.
Differences in geography, climate, and local demographics can
influence—if not determine—what sorts of policies best fit a
given part of the country. At the same time, voter preferences
may vary substantially from state to state. The United States is
an incredibly diverse country, and those policies that best fit
one part of the country may not be the best fit everywhere else.
In the environmental context, for example, ground‐level
ozone pollution is a problem in many cities around the coun‐
try.15 The general chemical processes that lead to ground‐level
ozone formation are the same from place to place. Yet, the exact
nature of the ozone pollution problem—what causes it, the ac‐
tual mix of activities that are contributing to it, and the sorts of
controls or policies that can address and solve it—differs from
New York to Los Angeles.16 Just as this mix of emission sources
varies, so do local preferences about the relative desirability of,
say, imposing greater limitations on automobiles as opposed to
stationary sources.17 In some cases, measures that might reduce
ozone levels in one part of the country might actually increase
ozone levels somewhere else.18 A one‐size‐fits‐all approach too
often results in one policy that fits nobody well, particularly
when we are dealing with more complex and variable prob‐
lems, such as environmental protection.19
There are regional differences in knowledge about environ‐
mental problems as well. Those closest to a given environmental
15. See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., RETHINKING THE
AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION (1992).

OZONE PROBLEM IN URBAN

16. See id. at 12.
17. See id. at 31.
18. Id. at 11 (“[Nitrogen oxide (NOx)] reductions can have either a beneficial or
detrimental effect on ozone concentrations, depending on the locations and emis‐
sion rates of [volatile organic compound] and NOx sources in a region.”).
19. See id. at 376 (“[T]he optimal set of controls . . . will vary from one place
to the next.”). For a broader discussion of this point, see Jonathan H. Adler, Juris‐
dictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 137–39
(2005).
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concern are more likely to recognize and understand it. Knowl‐
edge about the nature of a problem, what causes or contributes
to it, or even its very existence tends to be local. The biggest
problem that any centralized regulatory system faces is the
“knowledge problem”: the difficulty of having enough knowl‐
edge in a centralized location to drive economic and regulatory
decisionmaking.20 For example, well‐intentioned policies de‐
vised by experts in a federal regulatory agency might not trans‐
late well to a given local context, often because of the failure to
account for local knowledge. Those same experts also might be
unaware of what problems are, or should be, of greatest concern.
In fact, in many policy areas, from workers’ compensation to
environmental protection, local recognition of the problem and
remedial efforts predated federal action.
In the case of wetlands regulation, local jurisdictions became
aware of the need to conserve wetlands well before the federal
government.21 Indeed, state and local governments began wet‐
land conservation efforts at a time when the federal government
still was subsidizing wetland destruction.22 Moreover, the pat‐
tern of state‐level regulation was not what experts would have
predicted. Those jurisdictions that some would have expected to
regulate least and last in fact regulated first.23 They did so, in all
likelihood, because they were aware of the ecological and eco‐
nomic problems caused by wetland loss and were in a position
to do something about it, even though federal regulators had yet
to apply the Clean Water Act to wetland conservation.24

20. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519–20
(1945) (“[T]he knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never ex‐
ists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete
and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”).
21. This history is summarized in Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and
the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal
Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 47–54 (1999).
22. The first state wetland conservation law was adopted by Massachusetts in
1963 and was based (in part) on preexisting local measures. Id. at 48. Federal policies
that subsidized wetland destruction, such as flood control projects, continued well
into the 1970s. See David E. Gerard, Federal Flood Policies: 150 Years of Environmental
Mischief, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT 59, 64 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E.
Meiners eds., 2002); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of
Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 457 (2005) (summarizing other
federal policies that subsidized or otherwise encouraged wetland destruction).
23. See Adler, supra note 21, at 49.
24. Cf. id. at 48–50.

94

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 35

Even if perfect federal intervention were more effective than
a patchwork of state efforts, centralization still might not be
desirable. Federal regulation rarely, if ever, matches the theo‐
retical ideal. In assessing the desirability of federal interven‐
tion, we should focus on what the federal government is likely
to do, not on some abstract notion of what the government
would do in a perfect world.25 In the case of wetlands, although
a comprehensive federal wetlands protection statute might
have been preferable to variable state regulation, the federal
government never enacted such a law. The federal government
began regulating the filling of wetlands only after a federal
court interpreted the Clean Water Act to apply to wetlands,26
and, since then, the regulation has been less than ideal.27 Fur‐
ther, there are reasons to suspect that federal intervention dis‐
couraged further state‐level regulatory innovation.28
For years, the federal government acknowledged that regula‐
tors should consider ecological function when evaluating permit
applications from landowners seeking to fill wetlands because
the significance of losing or degrading a given wetland varies
depending on the ecological functions that wetland provides.29
Nonetheless, the federal government did little to incorporate
such considerations into the permit application process. One
empirical study found that in the process of reviewing wetland
permit grants or denials, the government appeared to give al‐
most no consideration to ecological function.30 Several states, on
the other hand, had acted. Even though state agencies suppos‐
edly lack the resources, skills, staff, and expertise to regulate
25. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (noting the pervasiveness of the “nirvana approach” in
which imperfect institutional arrangements are compared against an ideal,
unachievable norm); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 43 (1960) (noting the tendency to compare “a state of laissez faire
and some kind of ideal world”).
26. See NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
27. See Adler, supra note 21, at 62–66.
28. See Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on
State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 108–14 (2007).
29. In a different context, the government has instituted some incentive pro‐
grams to ensure that wetlands perform desired ecological functions. See Adler,
supra note 21, at 57–59.
30. See Michael J. Mortimer, Irregular Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: Is the Congress or the Army Corps of Engineers to Blame?, 13 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 445, 468–70 (1998).
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more effectively, several had already begun to incorporate eco‐
logical function into the wetland permitting process.31
Not only does decentralization enable policymakers to take
advantage of localized information about policy problems and
their potential solutions, but decentralization and interjurisdic‐
tional competition also foster policy discovery and policy en‐
trepreneurship. Decentralization allows for states to act, in Jus‐
tice Brandeis’s famous characterization, as “laboratories of
democracy.”32 Different states may adopt different approaches
to various public policy concerns, whether because of regional
differences, variable preferences, or different expectations
about the viability or practicality of competing policy ap‐
proaches. State‐level policy initiatives often are experiments
from which others may learn. States learn from each others’
successes and failures, fostering an iterative process through
which state‐level policy can improve over time.
Allowing state‐level experimentation also reduces the risks of
policy failures. When states try different things, all of the pro‐
verbial eggs are not in a single basket. If the policy succeeds,
other states retain the ability to follow suit (as does the federal
government, which has often modeled federal measures on suc‐
cessful state initiatives).33 If the policy fails, however, only one
jurisdiction must undo it, and others can learn to avoid such
mistakes. This discovery process can be slow and messy, but the
federal alternative—as it exists in practice—is no better.
Even though there is a strong case for presuming that decen‐
tralization is favorable, it is rebuttable. Leaving policy ques‐
tions in state hands might be desirable more often than not, but
in some instances there are persuasive justifications for federal
intervention. Appropriate federal intervention can even rein‐
force the competitive dynamic across jurisdictions.
Perhaps the most compelling case for federal intervention is
the existence of interstate spillovers, such as pollution gener‐
31. See William E. Taylor & Dennis Magee, Should All Wetlands Be Subject to the
Same Regulation?, 7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 32, 34 (1992) (reporting that ap‐
proximately ten states had begun considering ecological function to classify wet‐
lands in their regulatory schemes).
32. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. A recent example of such a federal program is the Affordable Care Act. See
Angie Drobnic Holan, RomneyCare & ObamaCare: Can you tell the difference?,
POLITIFACT.COM (May 18, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth‐o‐
meter/article/2011/may/18/romneycare‐and‐obamacare‐can‐you‐tell‐difference/.
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ated in one state that crosses into another.34 If, for example, pol‐
lution generated in one state causes problems in another state,
there is a case for federal action. Allowing such spillovers to
exist undermines interjurisdictional competition because spill‐
overs enable states to extraterritorialize the costs of their own
policy decisions onto other jurisdictions.35 In a truly competi‐
tive dynamic, on the other hand, each jurisdiction would bear
the costs and reap the benefits of its own decisions.
Where there is a case for federal intervention, the form such
intervention takes and whether the intervention improves the
status quo are critical. It is one thing to force a state to internalize
the costs of the spillover problems it creates. It is quite another to
use the existence of spillovers to justify far‐reaching national
regulations that do not directly address such concerns. In the
case of air pollution, for example, some downwind jurisdictions
might not believe that federal regulation through the Clean Air
Act is preferable to preexisting common law nuisance claims. In
one recent case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found the federal Clean Air Act barred North Carolina, a
downwind jurisdiction, from suing upwind polluters under fed‐
eral common law.36 The Clean Air Act’s regulatory scheme dis‐
places such suits, and yet the Act itself does not provide North
Carolina with much meaningful relief.37 More broadly, relatively
little federal environmental regulation targets, let alone re‐
dresses, interstate spillover concerns.38
Despite the problems inherent in federal regulation, one
common justification is the fear that interjurisdictional compe‐
tition will produce a “race to the bottom.”39 This theory posits
that competition will induce states to adopt ever lower levels of
regulation in pursuit of capital investment and that this “race”
34. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46
DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (“Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by any
single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for shift‐
ing regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance.”).
35. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regu‐
lation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 541–42 (1997).
36. See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2010).
37. See Adler, supra note 28, at 162.
38. See id. at 162–63.
39. See, e.g., Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An
Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the Race‐to‐the‐Bottom in State
Environmental Standard‐Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 55–86 (1998).
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will leave all states worse off than they would have been had
they not engaged in economic competition at the expense of
other concerns.40 The problem, however, is that the “race to the
bottom” theory lacks much theoretical or empirical support.41
States certainly compete with each other to create a more fa‐
vorable climate for business investment. But they also compete
with each other to provide the mix of goods and services that
individual taxpayers and prospective business employees
might want.42 A state like Virginia, for instance, might seek to
attract and retain a company like Smithfield Foods by adopting
less punitive environmental regulations, but it simultaneously
seeks to attract and retain businesses like AOL, which depend
upon a highly educated, professional workforce that is likely to
demand the provision of environmental amenities. Thus, com‐
peting for business does not necessarily push a state in a single
direction, as states are competing across several planes at the
same time. If anything, interjurisdictional competition creates
substantial incentives for states to figure out how to lessen the
tradeoff between otherwise competing demands—for instance,
to achieve higher levels of environmental protection at lower
cost—to attract firms and taxpayers across the board.
Empirical studies that seek to identify or quantify a “race to
the bottom” have largely come up short. In the environmental
area, for example, the available empirical evidence does not
demonstrate that states are systematically adopting suboptimal
levels of environmental protection.43 To the contrary, evidence
suggests, at least in those areas not dominated by federal inter‐
vention, that states learn from each other and move toward
adopting superior environmental policies because of interac‐
tions with their neighbors.44
Even in situations in which federal intervention might be justi‐
fied, it can suppress interjurisdictional competition. This sup‐
40. See id.
41. See Adler, supra note 28, at 151–54.
42. See Weingast, supra note 2, at 5.
43. See Adler, supra note 28, at 153–54.
44. See, e.g., PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 180–81, 191–92 (2004); Wal‐
lace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 15 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002)
(“States appear to be ‘pulled’ to higher levels of abatement spending by more
stringent measures in neighbouring states, but relatively lax regulations nearby
appear to have no effect on such expenditures.”).
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pression is self‐evident where federal action preempts alterna‐
tive state policies, but even non‐preemptive federal intervention
may dampen interjurisdictional competition and state‐level ex‐
perimentation.45 Setting a federal floor, even a non‐preemptive
federal floor, can create a de facto ceiling on state efforts, thereby
dampening the discovery process that results from state‐level
experimentation and interjurisdictional competition.46 Therefore,
calling for federal intervention—even intervention that is theo‐
retically justifiable—does not result in some enlightened savior
enacting ideal policy. Rather, the federal government is yet an‐
other imperfect institution with imperfect tools to address real
problems. Thus, it is necessary to consider the reality of federal
intervention, not its possible ideal. State governments are far from
perfect, but that does not mean the federal government is better.
Although decentralization and interjurisdictional competi‐
tion assist in the discovery and development of better public
policy, they are not without their critics. Indeed, the States
themselves are less‐than‐consistent defenders of federalism. As
Adam Smith observed, one of the biggest threats to market
competition is market participants themselves, because eco‐
nomic competitors tend to prefer profits to competition.47 The
same phenomenon is true in the context of interjurisdictional
competition. States may like to maintain a degree of autonomy,
but they do not necessarily like competing with one another.
Just as businesspeople collaborate and conspire to cartelize in‐
dustries, divvy up markets, and suppress competition, states
often accept federal intervention that reduces state autonomy
so long as it suppresses interjurisdictional competition.48 States
regularly seek federal policies that enable them to externalize
the costs of their decisions or act to subsidize poor, yet popular,
policy choices.49

45. For an explanation of how non‐preemptive federal regulation may discour‐
age state regulation, see Adler, supra note 28, at 98–106.
46. See id.
47. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 160 (1776) (“People of the same trade seldom meet together,
even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”).
48. See generally Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J.
557 (2000).
49. See id. at 559.
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That the States themselves are fair‐weather friends of feder‐
alism should not be surprising. Although federalism debates
often focus on the role of the States, the federalist system was
not created for the States’ benefit.50 Rather, the Constitution
created the system of federalism to discipline the state and fed‐
eral governments for the benefit of the people.51 As a conse‐
quence, it is ultimately up to the people to ensure that the sys‐
tem of federalism is maintained.

50. See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 89, 92–93 (2004).
51. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“The Constitution
does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state gov‐
ernments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials
governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”).

